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The Disability Tax Credit: Exploring Attitudes, Perceptions, and 




Cet article porte sur le crédit d’impôt pour personnes handicapées (CIPH), l’un des rares 
programmes fédéraux à offrir un financement direct aux personnes en situation de 
handicap. Cet article vise à analyser ce que révèle le CIPH sur les attitudes, les 
perceptions et les croyances à l’égard des handicaps. Il s’agit d’une importante 
contribution à la littérature, puisque les universitaires œuvrant dans le domaine du 
handicap ont montré à quel point les forces sociétales comme les attitudes, les 
perceptions et les croyances à l’égard des handicaps jouent elles-mêmes un rôle sur 
ceux-ci. En comparant les attitudes, les perceptions et les croyances des législateurs et 
des juges aux points de vue exprimés dans la littérature sur les handicaps, cet article 
révèle les stéréotypes blessants qui ne tiennent pas compte des différentes réalités des 
personnes en situation de handicap. De plus, l’article témoigne du désaccord qui existe 
entre quatre groupes, soit les universitaires du domaine du handicap, les législateurs, les 
juges et les contribuables, sur des questions comme la définition de « handicap » et les 
politiques appropriées pour encadrer la réalité des handicaps. L’auteure considère ce 
désaccord comme inquiétant, puisqu’il pourrait nuire à l’élaboration progressiste des 
politiques et à la clarté juridique. L’absence d’un consensus sur l’objectif du CIPH 
entrave entre autres son évaluation et son interprétation. Le CIPH est-il destiné à servir 
de soutien au revenu des personnes en situation de handicap (c’est-à-dire à servir de 
dépense fiscale) ou à prendre en considération les coûts qui nuisent à la capacité de payer 
(c’est-à-dire à servir de disposition formelle)? D’autres discussions et enquêtes 
s’imposent quant au CIPH et aux questions générales liées aux handicaps soulevées dans 
cet article. 
 
This article examines the disability tax credit (DTC), one of the few federal programs 
providing direct funding to persons with disabilities. The goal of the article is to explore 
the DTC as a window into attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs about disability. This is an 
important contribution to the literature as disability scholars have shown how societal 
forces, such as attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs about disability, contribute to disability 
itself. Through comparing attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of legislators and judges 
with the views expressed in the disability literature, the article reveals harmful 
stereotypes that fail to take into account the diverse realities of those experiencing 
disability. Further, the article shows a lack of agreement between four groups: disability 
scholars, legislators, judges, and taxpayers, on issues relating to the meaning of disability 
and the appropriate policy response to disability.  The author contends this disagreement 
is troublesome as it may impede progressive policymaking and legal clarity. In 
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particular, the evaluation and interpretation of the DTC is hindered by the lack of 
agreement about whether the DTC is intended to serve as income support for persons 
with disability (thus, operating as a tax expenditure), or to take into account costs 
negatively impacting ability to pay (thus, operating as a technical provision.) Further 
discussion and investigation of the DTC and the broader disability-related questions 
raised in this article are warranted. 
 
THE CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN AN INTEREST in disability issues, 
raising their profile within cabinet and charging the Minister of Sport and Persons with 
Disabilities with creating new accessibility legislation.1 This bringing of disability issues to the 
forefront presents a timely opportunity to examine how our society views disability. This article 
examines the disability tax credit (DTC), one of the few federal programs providing direct 
funding to persons with disabilities.2 The goal of the article is not to perform a full policy 
analysis of the DTC, but rather to explore the DTC as a window into attitudes, perceptions, and 
beliefs about disability. This is an important contribution to the literature as disability scholars 
have shown how societal forces, such as attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs about disability, 
contribute to disability.3 As others have pointed out, “attitudes disable.”4 The social construction 
of disability may be reflected in language used to describe persons with disabilities and 
assumptions relied upon when making and discussing policies and laws.5 Comparing these 
attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs with the views expressed in the disability literature can reveal 
harmful stereotypes that fail to take into account the diverse realities of those experiencing 
disability. Further, where there is a lack of agreement between the various subsets of society, the 
conflict may impede progressive policymaking and legal clarity. Conflicting views can also have 
a negative impact on the integrity of the tax system if they give rise to perceived unfairness of its 
provisions or their application.  
 In this article, I study (1) the disability and tax scholarship, (2) the DTC itself, and (3) 
recent case law on the DTC in order to gain an understanding of the attitudes, perceptions, and 
beliefs of scholars, legislators, judges, and individual taxpayers concerning two linked questions. 
The first question—what is disability?—encompasses questions including who is disabled, who 
                                                          
 
1 Employment and Social Development Canada, News Release, “What Does an Accessible Canada Mean to You?” 
(22 June 2016), online: <canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/news/2016/06/what-does-an-accessible-
canada-mean-to-you-.html> [perma.cc/PY6J-GSEL]; Letter from Rt. Hon. Justin Trudeau to Mr. Kent Hehr, 
Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities (October 4, 2017) online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-sport-and-persons-
disabilities-mandate-letter> [perma.cc/7UCQ-L879]. 
2 The other major federal direct support programs are the Canada Pension Plan and the Veterans Disability Pension.  
The term “persons with disabilities” is respectfully used here, while recognizing that there are conflicting views on 
the preferred term: see Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (London: Routledge, 2006) at 32. 
3 See discussion of social model in section I.A. Understanding Disability, below.  
4 See e.g. Richard Rieser, “Disability Discrimination, the Final Frontier: Disablement, History and Liberation” in 
Mike Cole, ed, Education, Equality and Human Rights: Issues of Gender, ‘Race’, Sexuality, Special Needs and 
Social Class (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2000) 118 at 119; Bradley A. Areheart, “Disability Trouble” (2010) 
29:2 Yale L & Pol’y Rev 347 at 379. 
5 Arlene S Kanter, “The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do with It or An Introduction to Disability Legal 
Studies” (2011) 42:2 Colum HRLR 403; Tamara Larre, “Pity the Taxpayer: The Tax Exemption for Personal Injury 
Damages as a Disability Policy” (2007) 33:1 Queen’s LJ 217.  
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gets to decide who is disabled, and the causes and effects of disability. The second question is: 
what is the appropriate policy response to disability? Examined in the context of tax policy, this 
second question can be more specifically framed as: what effect should disability have on taxes 
payable? If the DTC is viewed as the equivalent of a direct spending program that happens to be 
implemented through the tax system, it is also appropriate to ask: what financial supports, if any, 
should be available to persons with disabilities? The views of the four groups are compared 
throughout, and the analysis reveals that the various groups have differing answers to these 
questions. I argue that this misalignment of views of the groups is notable and troublesome. My 
brief conclusion reiterates that the question of how society should view and respond to disability 
should continue to be debated and discussed. It is hoped that this article can make a contribution 
to the discourse on disability and tax policy. 
 
I. PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY REFLECTED IN THE 
SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Here, I review disability and tax scholarship to provide a basic outline of prevailing expert views 
on the meaning of disability and the appropriate policy responses to disability. Additional 
literature is introduced later in the article to point out inconsistencies between the views of 
academics as compared to those of legislators, the judiciary, or taxpayers. 
 
A. UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY 
 
Disability was once understood as the exclusive result of bodily defects, and the policy response 
was to grant charity6 and benevolence to those in such tragic circumstances.7 Since the 
introduction of the social model of disability in the late 1970s,8 insisting that it was important to 
recognize the role society plays in creating and contributing to disability,9 many disability 
scholars have relentlessly discredited and condemned the medical and charitable models of 
disability. Although the social model has been subject to a number of criticisms, including its 
failure to account for the lived experiences relating to impairment,10 it is clear that disability 
scholars no longer see an exclusive focus on impairment as appropriate. Society’s creation of 
barriers to full inclusion is an important, if not the paramount, contributor to what we know as 
“disability.” Such barriers include negative views of persons with disabilities. For example, Kay 
                                                          
 
6 Justin Anthony Haegele & Samuel Hodge, “Disability Discourse: Overview and Critiques of the Medical and 
Social Models” (2016) 68:2 Quest 193 at 195. 
7 Kanter, supra note 5 at 419–21. Although the tragedy model of disability has been discredited, that is not to say 
that impairment can’t be tragic. See Dan Goodley, “Dis/entangling Critical Disability Studies” in Anne 
Waldschmidt, Hanjo Berressem & Moritz Ingwersen, eds, Culture-Theory-Disability: Encounters Between 
Disability Studies and Cultural Studies (Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript-Verlag, 2017) 81 at 85. 
8 Anne Waldschmidt, “Disability Goes Cultural: The Cultural Model of Disability as an Analytical Tool” in 
Waldschmidt, Berressem & Ingwersen, supra note 7, 19 at 20. 
9 Kanter, supra note 5 at 419–21; Haegele & Hodge, supra note 6 at 196–97. 
10  Carol Thomas, Female Forms: Experiencing and Understanding Disability (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 
1999); Tom Shakespeare & Nicholas Watson, “The Social Model of Disability: An Outdated Ideology?” in Sharon 
N  Barnartt & Barbara M Altman, eds, Exploring Theories and Expanding Methodologies: Where We Are and 
Where We Need to Go (Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2001) 9; Waldschmidt, supra note 8 at 19–21; Haegele & Hodge, 
supra note 6 at 197–98.  
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Schriner has stated that policies based on assumptions that persons with disabilities are 
unproductive, ill, immoral, and incompetent “reflect common misperceptions, myths, and 
prejudices about some kinds of individual differences.”11 
This shift away from exclusive focus on impairment in the literature has gained 
considerable momentum, including among international organizations such as the United 
Nations and the World Health Organization, which have acknowledged social contributors to 
disability.12 One specific example is the World Health Organization’s International Classification 
of Function, Disability and Health (ICF Model), developed based on what it refers to as the 
“biopsychosocial model.”13 While the medical model looked only to bodily function, this model 
recognizes that it is important to assess how bodily functions affect activities, and ultimately 
participation in society, and that external and personal factors influence function, disability, and 
health.14 
 
B. SOCIAL POLICY RESPONSES TO DISABILITY  
 
Disability policy, at the highest level, is a response to the issue of how society should treat 
disability. Lyn Jongbloed frames the key question as: what does society owe persons with 
disabilities? She concludes that we, as a society, have not yet decided.15 Scholars have weighed 
in on the appropriate policy response across a variety of disability-related policy issues, and a 
brief overview of the literature follows. 
What policies are dictated by the social model? David A Weisbach argues that the social 
model does not point to a particular policy result.16 However, the indisputable shift from the 
medical and charitable models of disability to the social model has played an important role in 
discussions about the appropriate policy response.17 For one thing, the shift meant that removing 
barriers to full participation in society and achieving autonomy and human dignity18 became seen 
as a responsibility of society, through government.19   
There is a tension in the disability scholarship between the calls for treatment of persons 
with disabilities as equals, and the need to recognize difference as compared to non-disabled 
people in order to achieve full participation in society.20 The rise of universalism has perhaps 
                                                          
 
11 Kay Schriner, “The Political Implications of the Disability Construct in Public Policy” (2000) 11:2 J Disability 
Policy Studies 103 at 104.  
12 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 61/106, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, UN 
Doc A/Res/61/106; World Health Organization, The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and 
Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001), online: <who.int/classifications/icf/en> [perma.cc/5TEE-
Q5ZA]. 
13 World Health Organization, supra note 12. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Lyn Jongbloed, “Disability Policy in Canada: An Overview” (2003) 13:4 J Disability Policy Studies 203 at 207. 
16 David A Weisbach, “Toward a New Approach to Disability Law” (2009) 47 U Chicago Legal F at 67, drawing on 
the work of Adam M Samaha, “What Good is the Social Model of Disability?” (2007) 74:4 U Chicago L Rev. 
17 Waldschmidt, supra note 8 at 21. 
18 Jerome Bickenbach, “Universally Design Social Policy: When Disability Disappears?” (2014) 36:16 Disability 
and Rehabilitation 1320 at 1323. 
19 Laura Wilkinson-Meyers et al, “To Live an Ordinary Life: Resource Needs and Additional Costs for People with 
a Physical Impairment” (2015) 30:7 Disability and Society 976 at 989. 
20 Theodore P Seto & Sande L Buhai, “Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference” (2006) 
154 U Pa L Rev 1053 at 1071–73. 
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contributed to this tension. Universalism views human functioning along a continuum and has 
emerged, alongside the social model, in opposition to the medical model. Instead of using a 
minority group approach (under which some persons would qualify as disabled) and its limited 
vision of “normal,” universalism views disability as universal, multidimensional, and variable.21 
While subscribers to universalism have advocated for a policy approach that accommodates all 
human variation, thus applying universally across all of society,22 others have called for policies 
that meet the specific needs of individuals (through, for example, individualized and 
personalized direct funding for persons with disabilities).23   
Jerome Bickenbach argues that targeted policies are required because the needs of 
individuals are varied.24 However, he also recognizes that determining eligibility for targeted 
policies is expensive and is usually dependent on the medical opinion of doctors who are not 
well informed about disability.25 Others have criticized this use of medical professionals as 
gatekeepers for putting the person in a sick role26 and ignoring the social contributors to 
disability.27 Another problem noted with targeted policies is that they can incentivize people to 
“game the system”28 and trap disabled people in the “disability benefits culture.”29   
 Scholars have reasoned that direct financial payments to people with disabilities are 
consistent with the premises underlying the social model.30 Due to society’s contributions to 
disability, it is incumbent upon government to compensate for this through income 
redistribution.31 Michael Palmer points out that persons with disabilities are prone to deprivation 
for reasons of reduced capacity to earn, additional expenses, and a reduced availability of 
household labour due to caregiving by family members.32  
 
                                                          
 
21 Ian Joiner, “Obscuring Disability: The Impact of a Universalism/Minority Group Dichotomy on Assessing 
Equality” in Mary Ann McColl & Lyn Jongbloed, eds, Disability and Social Policy in Canada (Concord: Captus 
Press, 2006) 87 at 92. 
22 Irving Kenneth Zola, “Toward the Necessary Universalizing of a Disability Policy” (1989) 67 Milbank Q 401. 
23 Bickenbach, supra note 18; Dave Sims & Joanna Whisker, “Personalisation and Disabled People: The Rhetoric 
and the Reality” (2014) 17:3 Social Work & Social Sciences Rev 137; Jennifer Hall-Lande, “County Administrator 
Perspectives on the Implementation of Self-Directed Supports” (2012) 22:4 J Disability Policy Studies 247 at 248. 
24 Bickenbach, supra note 18 at 1323. 
25 Ibid; Haegele & Hodge, supra note 6 at 195–196. 
26 Colin Barnes, “Disability, Disability Studies and the Academy” in John Swain et al, eds, Disabling Barriers-
Enabling Environments, 2nd ed (London: SAGE Publications, 2004) 28 at 29; Haegele & Hodge, supra note 6 at 
195–96. 
27 See e.g. Anne Crichton & Lyn Jongbloed, Disability and Social Policy in Canada (North York, ON: Captus Press, 
1998) at 10; Carol Thomas, Female Forms: Experiencing and Understanding Disability (Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1999). 
28 Bickenbach, supra note 18 at 1323; Simoni Symeonidou, “New Policies, Old Ideas: The Question of Disability 
Assessment Systems and Social Policy” (2014) 29:8 Disability & Society 1260 at 1268. 
29 Robert E Drake et al, “Mental Health Disability: An International Perspective” (2012) 23:2 J Disability Policy 
Studies 110 at 112–13. 
30 See e.g. Matthew Diller, “Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs” (1998) 76:5 Tex L Rev 1003 at 1006–07. 
31 Wilkinson-Meyers et al, supra note 19 at 989. Tom Shakespeare argues that redistribution is justified due to a 
combination of societal barriers and impairment arising from the “random effect of genes or disease.” See 
Shakespeare, supra note 2 at 67. 
32 Michael Palmer, “Disability and Poverty: A Conceptual Review” (2011) 21:4 J Disability Policy Studies 210 at 
212–13. 
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C. TAX POLICY RESPONSES TO DISABILITY  
 
In this section, I move from the disability studies literature to the tax policy literature dealing 
with disability. A number of tax policy scholars have pointed out that there are two distinct 
reasons why tax legislation might respond to disability.33 First, income tax legislation might be 
used as a means for implementing a broader social policy, in which case disability-related 
provisions would be considered tax expenditures.34 Second, income tax legislation might 
recognize disability for tax policy reasons, in which case the provisions would be considered 
technical tax provisions implemented to improve the tax system in terms of its primary goals of 
“raising revenue and redistributing income.”35 
A handful of tax policy articles considering the DTC, all written between 2000 and 2006, 
have invariably recognized the need to consider whether the DTC is, or should be, a tax 
expenditure, a technical tax provision, or perhaps both.36 In two of the four articles, the writers 
preferred to view the DTC as a technical tax provision,37 and in the other instances, the writers 
saw the DTC as playing a dual role, as both a tax expenditure and technical tax provision.38 
While none of the tax or legal scholars39 identified the DTC as solely a tax expenditure, at least 
one article authored by a disability scholar examined the DTC on the assumption that it was a tax 
expenditure (without analysis).40 Perhaps this serves as evidence, though limited, that the 
perspective of the writer plays an important role in how the credit is viewed as, for tax policy 
academics, the question of whether a provision is a tax expenditure is a frequent starting point 
for tax policy analysis, whereas for disability scholars, the focus on disability policy leads to a 
natural assumption that the DTC be viewed as a tax expenditure. Regardless, it is apparent from 
the literature that the DTC could be classified as either a technical tax provision or a tax 
expenditure, or perhaps even both concurrently. 
 The tax expenditure literature clearly indicates that policies placed in the tax system for 
purposes other than measuring income should be evaluated according to their non-tax policy 
goals.41 That is, just because a policy is in the tax system does not make it immune from analysis 
                                                          
 
33 Raquel Chisholm, “The Disability Tax Credit and Amputees: It’s Time for a Reality Check” (2003) 2:1 JL & 
Equality 156; Michael Smart & Mark Stabile, “Tax Support for the Disabled in Canada: Economic Principles and 
Options for Reform” (2006) 54:2 Can Tax J 407; David Duff, “Disability and the Income Tax” (2000) 45:4 McGill 
LJ 797; Seto & Buhai, supra note 20. 
34 For a discussion of tax expenditures, see Peter W Hogg, Joanne E Magee & Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian 
Income Tax Law, 9th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2017) at 64–72. 
35 Tim Edgar, Arthur Cockfield & Martha O’Brien, eds, Materials on Canadian Income Tax, 15th ed (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2015) at 73. 
36 Duff, supra note 33; Smart & Stabile, supra note 33; Chisholm, supra note 33; Lisa Philipps, “Disability, Poverty 
and the Income Tax: The Case for Refundable Credits” (2001) 16 J L & Soc Pol’y 77.  
37 Smart & Stabile, supra note 33 at 408; Duff, supra note 33 at 840. Note that in an American article, Seto and 
Buhai view disability-related provisions as technical tax provisions. See supra note 20. 
38 Chisholm, supra note 33 at 188; Philipps, supra note 36 at 93. 
39 Here, “tax scholars” refers to academics studying tax, including those in the fields of economics, business, and 
law, while “legal scholars” refers to academics in the legal field, who may or may not focus their scholarship on 
taxation law.  
40 Michael J. Prince, “Tax Policy as Social Policy: Canadian Tax Assistance for People with Disabilities” (2001) 
27:4 Can Public Pol’y 487. 
41 Hogg, Magee & Li, supra note 34 at 65. 
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as a spending program.42 Therefore, the disability literature on social policy responses to 
disability, described in the previous section, should be taken into account if the DTC is evaluated 
as a tax expenditure. Additionally, tax scholars have pointed out that the decision to place a 
policy within the income tax system comes with some potential benefits (such as built-in income 
calculation and the potential for administrative efficiencies)43 as well as potential drawbacks due 
to the structure of the income tax system (such as a lack of flexibility relating to application 
criteria, amount, and timing).44 Hence, it is important to question whether financial support for 
persons with disabilities should be located within the income tax system. 
Technical tax provisions are evaluated differently than tax expenditures, usually by 
applying three primary criteria: equity, neutrality, and simplicity.45 In the case of disability 
provisions, equity is particularly relevant. Horizontal equity requires that taxpayers in the same 
position pay the same amount of tax, and vertical equity demands that taxpayers in different 
positions pay appropriately different amounts of tax.46 Ability to pay is often used to compare the 
relative positions of taxpayers,47 and scholars have argued that it is appropriate to adjust income 
for extraordinary disability-related costs because of the resulting decreased ability to pay.48   
 
II. PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY REFLECTED IN THE 
LEGISLATION 
  
After describing the DTC in this section, I explain how it reflects certain views of disability and 
the appropriate policy response to disability. In doing so, I point out discrepancies between views 
reflected in the DTC and those reflected in the scholarship. 
 
A. THE DTC AND RELATED CREDITS  
 
Section 118.3 of the Income Tax Act49 (ITA) permits individual taxpayers to claim the DTC 
where certain requirements are met. First, under the function impairment requirement, the 
individual must have “one or more severe and prolonged impairments in physical or mental 
functions.”50 Second, under the marked restriction requirement, the ability to perform at least one 
basic activity of daily living must be “markedly restricted,” or would be if not for certain 
                                                          
 
42 Ibid at 64–65. 
43 Tamara Larre, “The Children’s Fitness Tax Credit: Right Message, Wrong Policy Instrument” in Lisa Philipps, 
Neil Brooks & Jinyan Li, eds, Tax Expenditures: State of the Art (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2011) 12:1 at 
12:6–7. 
44 Ibid at 12:10–11. 
45 Hogg, Magee & Li, supra note 34 at 47.  
46 Ibid at 49.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Seto & Buhai, supra note 20 at 1100–03, 1143.  
49 RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 118.3 [ITA]. 
50 Ibid, s 118.3(1)(a). Prolonged is defined as lasting, or expected to last, for a continuous 12-month period (ibid, s 
118.4(1)(a)). 
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essential and regular therapy.51 The activity is markedly restricted where all or substantially all 
of the time, even with appropriate devices and medication, the “individual is blind or is unable 
(or requires an inordinate amount of time) to perform a basic activity of daily living.”52 Such 
basic activities of daily living are defined in the legislation to include, for example, “mental 
functions necessary for everyday life,” feeding and dressing oneself, “speaking so as to be 
understood” and hearing to understand, eliminating, and walking.53 The definition specifically 
excludes working, housekeeping, and social and recreational activities.54  
In order to claim the credit against taxes owing, the taxpayer and an appropriate medical 
practitioner must fill in a T2201 form to certify that the function impairment and marked 
restriction requirements are met,55 and the taxpayer must file the form.56 While the credit is not 
refundable,57 where the individual has insufficient income to use it, the DTC may be claimed by 
a relative on whom the individual is dependent.58 The amount of the credit, like many other 
credits, is indexed for inflation.59 In 2017 the maximum value of the credit was $1,216.60   
To understand the role of the DTC, it is important to note that a series of other credits are 
also available in relation to disability of the taxpayer or a dependent. The medical expense tax 
credit recognizes certain costs, including a number of expenses beyond medical services and 
drugs,61 above a certain “floor” amount.62 The caregiver credit, introduced in 2017 as a 
consolidation of three credits, is available in varying amounts to caregivers to certain eligible 
dependent relatives.63 
 
                                                          
 
51 Ibid s 118.3(1)(a.1). Alternatively, the marked restriction requirement can be met where the cumulative effects of 
multiple restrictions are considered the equivalent of “having a marked restriction in the ability to perform a basic 
activity of daily living” (ibid). 
52 Ibid s 118.4(1)(b). 
53 Ibid s 118.4(1)(c). 
54 Ibid s 118.4(1)(d). 
55 Ibid s 118.3(1)(a.2)–(a.3). 
56 Ibid s 118.3(1)(b). 
57 Credits are applied against taxes owing. Where taxpayers are unable to use up the whole amount of a credit 
because they do not have enough taxes owing, a refundable credit will result in the government issuing payment to 
the taxpayer for any unused credit amount.  
58 Supra note 49, s 118.3(2).  
59 Ibid s 117.1. 
60 The maximum credit amount is $8,113. See Government of Canada, “Disability Tax Credit” Government of 
Canada, online: < canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/individuals/segments/tax-credits-deductions-persons-
disabilities/disability-tax-credit.html> [perma.cc/3FPQ-RCDH]. To determine the value, this amount is multiplied 
by the lowest marginal rate (ITA, supra note 49, ss 118.3(1), 248(1)), which is equal to 15% (supra note 49, s 
117(2)(a)). 
61 These include costs of group home care, attendant care, or in-school care (ITA, supra note 49, s 118.2(2)(b)–(e)); 
atypical renovation and home building costs; van expenses; tutoring; and prescribed devices or equipment (supra 
note 49, s 118.2(2)). 
62 The credit permits expenses to be claimed in excess of the lesser of 3% of the taxpayer’s net income, and the fixed 
amount for that particular year ($2,237 in 2016) (ITA, supra note 49, s 118.2(1), Government of Canada, “T1-2016- 
Federal Tax”, online: <canada.ca/content/dam/cra-arc/migration/cra-arc/E/pbg/tf/5000-s1/5000-s1-fill-16e.pdf> 2 
[perma.cc/3GRM-F9FG]. 
63 ITA, supra note 49, s 118(1)(b)(iv), s 118(1)(b.1), and 118(1)(d)).. supporting minor children with disabilities 
(supra note 49, s 118(1)(b.1)); and a dependent adult credit for taxpayers supporting dependent adults (supra note 
49, s 118(1)(d)). 
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B. LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING OF DISABILITY  
 
What can we glean about the way that drafters viewed disability from looking at the DTC itself? 
One could posit that legislators had a binary understanding of disability; that is, that the 
population can be divided into disabled (entitled to the credit) and non-disabled (not entitled to 
the credit). This is entirely inconsistent with the human variation or universalism model of 
disability in the literature.64 The DTC has also been criticized for perpetuating the medical 
model, which focuses on the impairment and deviations from a norm.65 
By focusing on the level of impairment and its effect on basic functions as opposed to the 
effects on participation in society, the DTC appears to either: (1) be based on pity or charity (that 
is, anyone with a certain impairment deserves to be compensated for their disability) or (2) to 
correlate the level of impairment with the financial costs of disability. The former, based on pity 
or charity, is inappropriate, and the latter is certainly a very rough estimate. Equating impairment 
with disability-related costs is also inconsistent with the social model because it largely leaves 
societal factors out of the equation. Put in another way, the DTC’s focus on impairment and 
basic functioning ignores important aspects of disability by failing to look to the effect of 
functional limitations on the individual’s participation in society, considering relevant contextual 
factors. Joseph J Chen references the ICF Model66 and points out that traditional functional 
assessments miss out on the participation element, which is not just affected by bodily functional 
limitations, but also by external and personal elements of disability.67 This point is directly 
applicable to the DTC. For example, if one compares two people with the same impairments and 
functional restrictions, including an inability to drive a car, but one lives in an area with widely 
available, inexpensive, and accessible public transit and the other does not, the latter will 
experience greater disability and disability-related costs because of the different environment.  
These differences do not affect eligibility for, or amount of, the DTC. 
 
C. LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICY RESPONSE TO 
DISABILITY  
 
By enacting the DTC, legislators must have thought it appropriate for persons with disabilities to 
be given beneficial tax treatment (1) in the form of a non-variable credit amount, (2) if they (or a 
close family member) otherwise have taxes payable, and (3) so long as a medical professional 
finds specific criteria are met. Below, each of these three aspects of the DTC is examined, after 
first discussing the legislative purpose behind the DTC.  
As previously discussed in section I.C., the DTC is most often classified by policy 
scholars as a technical tax provision, as opposed to a tax expenditure.68 The Technical Advisory 
Committee on Tax Measures for Persons with Disabilities explained that tax measures for 
persons with disabilities are “not meant to subsidize or offset … [disability-related] costs, but 
                                                          
 
64 See Joiner, supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
65 Chisholm, supra note 33; Philipps, supra note 36 at 103–04. For more on the medical model, see Michael Oliver 
& Colin Barnes, The New Politics of Disablement, 2nd ed (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012) at 85ff.  
66 See World Health Organization, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
67 Joseph J Chen, “Functional Capacity Evaluation and Disability” (2007) 27 Iowa Orthopaedic J 121 at 124–25. 
68 See section I.C. Tax Policy Responses to Disability, above, for more on this topic.  
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rather to achieve equity and greater fairness in the allocation of the tax burden.”69 The reference 
to equity and fairness in allocating the tax burden indicates that the DTC was implemented to 
measure income, and therefore should be characterized as a technical tax provision. On the other 
hand, there are reasons to question the Technical Advisory Committee’s statement, as there are a 
couple of features, namely its nature as a credit rather than a deduction and its inclusion in the 
tax expenditure report, that indicate that the legislators intended the DTC to operate as a social 
policy measure, and thus a tax expenditure. However, the inclusion in the tax expenditure 
report70 cannot be used as conclusive proof that the DTC was intended to serve a non-tax policy 
purpose as there are differing views on how to define tax expenditures, and Canada’s tax 
expenditure report takes a broad approach to identifying tax expenditures.71 Thus, there is 
uncertainty surrounding the intended legislative purpose of the DTC. 
   
1. THE TAXPAYER OR A RELATED CAREGIVER MUST OTHERWISE HAVE TAXES 
PAYABLE 
 
As a non-refundable, transferable credit, the DTC can only be used against taxes payable by the 
taxpayer or a close family member upon whom she or he is dependent. Assuming the DTC is a 
technical tax provision based on reduced ability to pay, the tax policy literature suggests that the 
credit should instead be in the form of a deduction from income (and therefore, like a non-
refundable credit, would only be of use where taxes were payable).72 However, where expenses 
are difficult to itemize, some have pointed out that a standard amount may be more appropriate.73   
If the DTC is a tax expenditure, then the literature would tend to support a policy based 
on disability-related costs and/or reduced capacity to earn income.74 In no way do these connect 
to income of the disabled person or a caregiver. In fact, those with the greatest costs and lowest 
capacity to earn are unlikely to have sufficient income to use a credit, and will be in greatest 
need if they do not have a caregiver with sufficient income to use the credit. Therefore, the calls 
to make the credit refundable75 are well-founded if it is viewed as a tax expenditure.   
Maintaining its form as a credit, as opposed to a deduction, makes sense if it is viewed as 
a tax expenditure because a deduction would be worth more to those who need it the least (the 
                                                          
 
69 Technical Advisory Committee on Tax Measures for Persons with Disabilities, Disability Tax Fairness: Report of 
the Technical Advisory Committee on Tax Measures for Persons with Disabilities (Ottawa: Government of Canada 
Publications, 2004) at 19, online: <publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/F34-1-2004E.pdf> [perma.cc/T6CJ-
M2CM].   
70 Department of Finance Canada, Report on Federal Tax Expenditures: Concepts, Estimates and Evaluations, 2016 
(Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2016) at 35, online: <fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2016/taxexp-depfisc16-eng.pdf> 
[perma.cc/QZE9-CBFW]. 
71 Hogg, Magee & Li, supra note 34 at 64. 
72 Smart & Stabile, supra note 33 at 421.  
73 Duff, supra note 33 at 836. 
74 See Palmer, supra note 32 and accompanying text.   
75 Sherri Torjman, Disability Supports: Missing on the Policy Radar (Toronto: Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 
2015) at 6 [Torjman, Disability Supports]; Philipps, supra note 36; The Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 
“Proposal for A Refundable Disability Tax Credit”, online: <ccdonline.ca/en/socialpolicy/income/tax-credit-
propoal> [perma.cc/VVT2-MPAZ]; House of Commons, Standing Committee on Human Resources Development 
and the Status of Persons with Disabilities, Tax Fairness for Persons with Disabilities (December 2002) at 22 
[House of Commons, Tax Fairness].   
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“upside-down effect”).76 However, even if it were a refundable credit, using the income tax 
system to provide income support could be challenged because it would not reach people who do 
not file tax returns.77   
 
2. ALL QUALIFIED TAXPAYERS RECEIVE THE SAME SET AMOUNT 
 
The DTC grants the same credit to all who qualify. Whether the credit is a technical tax 
provision or a tax expenditure, the credit amount should ideally vary according to costs not 
otherwise already accounted for in the tax system (in the case of a technical tax provision) or 
disability-related costs and/or reduced earning capacity (in the case of a tax expenditure). Using 
a set amount sacrifices accuracy and fairness for administrative simplicity. As mentioned above, 
there is some justification for this as disability costs are not always easy to itemize.78 
  
3. DISABILITY MUST BE CERTIFIED BY MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS 
 
Under the DTC, the determination of who is disabled (or perhaps, disabled enough) is primarily 
left to medical professionals. Melinda Jones and Lee Ann Basser Marks have criticized the 
medical certification requirements imposed by various disability policies on the grounds that 
they reflect the medical model, and can be “intrusive, time consuming, and expensive.”79 
Because of a lack of coordination of disability supports, the applicant may have to repeatedly 
obtain medical certification to meet the requirements of various programs.80  
In her article on the DTC, Raquel Chisholm describes the process of establishing disability 
and gives an example of a case where “[i]t was only by portraying himself in [an] incredibly 
undignified manner that [a] man was able to satisfy the criteria for the DTC.”81 In order to 
qualify for the DTC, a taxpayer must focus on his or her physical, mental, or psychological 
shortcomings to convince a doctor, and perhaps also a government agency or even a judge, that 
she or he is impaired to a degree that warrants special tax treatment. Chisholm points out that a 
credit places the person in the sick role, needing to “tug the heartstrings of the tax adjudicators 
by portraying herself as fitting neatly into the stereotype of the dependent invalid.”82 In the 
context of looking at disability programs more generally, Joseph Dumit explains: 
 
[A]pplicants for disability are between a rock and a hard place. If they do dress the 
part, then they are ‘acting’ ill. But if they do not then they will not be considered ill. 
                                                          
 
76 Hogg, Magee & Li, supra note 34 at 379. 
77 In most cases, individuals are not required to file tax returns where no taxes are owing (ITA, supra note 49, s 
150(1.1)). This includes many low-income individuals and those whose income is not taxable because it is exempt 
under the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5, s 87. 
78 Duff, supra note 33 at 836. 
79 Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks, “Law and the Social Construction of Disability,” in Melinda Jones & 
Lee Ann Basser Marks, eds, Disability, Divers-Ability and Legal Change (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) 1 at 
17. It is notable that in the context of Canada’s state-provided health care, the expenses would be largely borne by 
the state. 
80 Sherri Torjman, Five-Point Plan for Reforming Disability Supports (Ottawa: The Caledon Institute of Social 
Policy, 2007) at 2 [Torjman, Five-Point Plan]. 
81 Chisholm, supra note 33 at 178. 
82 Ibid at 158–59. 
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Therefore their only choice is to pretend to be who they actually are, in the 
institution’s view. They must work at ‘‘achieving appropriate appearance’’ … and 
‘‘look and act sick’’… .83 
 
It is not a stretch to suggest that having to play the sick role could have a negative effect on self-
esteem, self-image, and identity, and may even impede wellness.84   
 
III. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY REFLECTED 
IN THE RECENT CASE LAW  
 
Here, I study recent DTC cases with a view to determining the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs 
of judges in relation to disability and the appropriate policy response. A study of the recent DTC 
cases reveals that some judges still appear to hold outdated views of disability that perpetuate the 
medical and charitable models of disability. This is particularly concerning because the courts 
have chosen to take an active role in determining who is entitled to the DTC. Here, the cases 
reviewed are limited to those from 2006 to 2017 to ensure they represent relatively current views 
of the judiciary.85 Where these views clash with those of the other groups already reviewed 
(scholars and legislators), I explore these discrepancies.  
It is important to recognize that the usefulness of cases to determine judicial perspectives 
on disability is limited. As the cases are an interpretation of existing law, it is not easy to 
separate the normative claims (i.e., what the law should be) from the legal claims (i.e., what the 
law is). The primary role of judges is obviously to apply the law, and thus focus on the 
legislators’ intentions.86 However, the language used, and even the decisions made,87 can reveal 
the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs held by judges. The focus in this discussion is not on 
situations where judges simply apply the law in a rather straightforward manner; rather, the 
discussion centres on judges’ language choices and situations where judges made more difficult 
interpretive decisions that appear to reflect a certain understanding of disability. Similarly, my 
aim here is not to evaluate the correctness of the judicial decisions, but, rather, it is to expose 
views of disability that may have impacted judges’ reasoning. 
                                                          
 
83 Joseph Dumit, “Illnesses You Have to Fight to Get: Facts as Forces in Uncertain, Emergent Illnesses” (2006) 62:3 
Social Science & Medicine 577 at 586 [citations omitted].  
84 Marcus JH Huibers & Simon Wessely, “The Act of Diagnosis: Pros and Cons of Labelling Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome” (2006) 36:7 Psychological Medicine 895 at 898. 
85 I searched electronic databases for cases from the Tax Court of Canada and Federal Court of Appeal involving the 
application of the DTC. The cases were then reviewed with the view to finding any commentary by judges that 
could be construed as reflecting views of disability. The cases discussed in this article were those I considered 
noteworthy in this regard.   
86 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 
2; Brian J. Arnold, “Statutory Interpretation: Some Thoughts on Plain Meaning” in Report of Proceedings of Fiftieth 
Tax Conference, 1998 Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999) 6:1. 
87 While this article does not go so far as some critical legal theorists (see e.g., Joseph William Singer, “The Player 
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory” (1984) 94:1 Yale LJ 1), the discussion in this section of the article 
assumes that judicial attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs affect legal decision-making. For a discussion of critical 
legal theory, see Randal N Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2001) at 65–71 and John Hasnas, “Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or 
How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument” (1995) 45:1 Duke LJ 84. 
103




A. DISABILITY IS A TRAGEDY  
 
The language used in some of the recent DTC cases suggests that some judges view disability as 
a tragedy. For example, the word “suffers” is repeatedly used in the case of McMillan v Canada 
(McMillan),88 which is contrary to the disability literature, most of which critiques the relegation 
of persons with disabilities to the sick role. Similarly, judges’ offers of “sympathy” to the 
disabled taxpayer in Gourlay v R (Gourlay)89 and to the parents of a disabled child in Marceau v 
R (Marceau)90 reflect a charitable model of disability. As a final example, the judge’s description 
of the situation in Lewis v R (Lewis),91 involving a child with vision impairment, as “tragic, and 
as heartbreaking,”92 once again perpetuates the tragic and charitable models of disability. 
 
B. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES ARE “SICK” AND INCAPABLE  
 
Although in at least one case (Bleiler v R)93 the judge acknowledged stereotypes affecting 
persons with disabilities,94 in other cases judges have made statements that are inconsistent with 
the disability literature’s focus on equality for persons with disability, variability of disability, 
and social causes of disability. For example, in Fontaine v R (Fontaine)95 the Court insinuated 
that only “abnormal” people would qualify for the credit,96 a view that is inconsistent with the 
literature that sees disability as human variation and people with disabilities as capable and 
equals. The stereotypical view of people with disabilities as necessarily incapable was also 
perpetuated in other cases. For example, in Pham v Canada (Pham),97 the taxpayer’s ability to 
represent himself in court was used to support a decision that the DTC requirements were not 
met,98 as was the ability of the taxpayer to testify in court, work, and go to school in Walkowiak v 
R (Walkowiak).99 Further, in Fontaine the Court bolstered the denial of the DTC with the fact 
that the taxpayer filed a notice of appeal himself.100 What is particularly troubling is that in these 
cases the Court often did little, if anything, to tie assessments of the claimants’ capabilities to 
represent themselves in the legal process to the specific impairments or restrictions claimed. The 
cases, along with the DTC’s application process, may encourage future DTC claimants to 
underplay their abilities and assume the sick role,101 and may create further barriers to persons 
                                                          
 
88 2010 TCC 189 at paras 10, 14, 16–17 [McMillan]. 
89 2006 TCC 493 at para 25 [Gourlay]. 
90 2007 FCA 352 at para 14. 
91 2007 TCC 416 [Lewis]. 
92 Ibid at para 20. 
93 2014 TCC 296 [Bleiler]. 
94 Ibid at para 10. 
95 2009 TCC 162 [Fontaine]. 
96 Ibid at para 20. 
97 2010 TCC 588 [Pham]. 
98 Ibid at para 11. 
99 2012 TCC 453 at paras 26–27 [Walkowiak]. 
100 Fontaine, supra note 95 at para 21.  
101 Barnes, supra note 26 at 28. See also the text accompanying note 26 and section II.C.3. Disability Must be 
Certified by Medical Professionals, above. 
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with disabilities participating in the legal system, a problem already recognized in the disability 
literature.102 
 
C. COURTS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DETERMINING 
ELIGIBILITY 
  
As set out above, there are three main DTC eligibility requirements set out in the ITA: (1) 
function impairment, (2) marked restriction, and (3) medical certification of the first and second 
requirements. Given that the legislation requires certification by medical professionals, the courts 
could decide to rely on the medical certification to conclusively establish the first and second 
requirements. However, it is apparent from the judicial decisions that this is not the case. This is 
not entirely surprising as the function impairment and marked restriction requirements are 
separate from the medical certification requirement. On the other hand, one might expect judges 
to limit themselves to matters they are traditionally tasked with and thus perhaps well-positioned 
to assess, such as determining credibility and interpreting unclear statements on medical forms. 
However, it is clear from some cases set out below that judges have been willing to substitute 
their own judgment on medical issues for that of medical professionals.  
In Pekofsky v R (Pekofsky)103 and McDermid v R,104 judges appeared to consider 
testimony by various parties (the children for whom the credit was being claimed, the parents, 
and the medical practitioners) to assist in determining the accuracy or meaning of the doctors’ 
assessments on the required forms. This does not seem inappropriate as judges are experts of 
these types of factual interpretations. In Pekofsky, after stating that the medical practitioner’s 
opinions (in this case, two positive certificates) were not conclusive, the Court went on to satisfy 
itself that the eligibility requirements were met105 by relying on testimony of the child and her 
mother concerning the effect of the disability on their daily lives. The judge concluded that 
“although not a psychologist myself, I was able to sense the accuracy of the conclusions reached 
by the psychologists.”106   
The more troubling cases are where the judges appear to give weight to their own 
observations of the taxpayer’s impairment, something that one would expect medical 
professionals to be in a much better position to assess. For example, in Pham the Court’s own 
observations about the taxpayer’s hearing abilities, as demonstrated in court, were used to 
corroborate a medical opinion.107 In Gibson v R (Gibson),108 the Court commented that the 
severity of the disability was evident during the hearing.109 In Fontaine, the Court compared 
ambiguous and conflicting medical certificates and concluded that the DTC requirements were 
not met.110 In doing so, the Court appeared to perform its own assessment of the taxpayer’s 
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103 2014 TCC 183 [Pekofsky]. 
104 2014 TCC 264. 
105 Pekofsky, supra note 103 at para 18.   
106 Ibid at para 20. 
107 Pham, supra note 97 at para 11. 
108 2014 TCC 236 [Gibson]. 
109 Ibid at para 28. 
110 Fontaine, supra note 95. 
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cognitive state, in concluding that there was nothing “abnormal” in his testimony.111 In Pham, 
the doctor’s certificate, along with testimony from the doctor, led the judge to conclude that the 
requirements were not met, adding her own observations about the taxpayer’s disability to 
corroborate the doctor’s evidence: “… the appellant had sufficient hearing capability to represent 
himself at the hearing of his appeal. My observations during the hearing support Dr. 
Finkelstein’s assessment.”112   
The importance of the role of courts in determining eligibility is also highlighted in cases 
where the courts were willing to consider granting the DTC despite a negative medical 
certificate. In Pelletier v R (Pelletier),113 Justice Tardif relied on Buchanan v R (Buchanan)114 for 
the proposition that although the Court’s role was not to substitute its own medical judgment, it 
was able to determine if an unambiguously negative medical certificate should be interpreted as a 
positive certificate.115 This is actually a rather surprising statement given that medical 
certification that the impairment requirements are met (i.e., a positive certificate) is a specific 
requirement in the legislation. In the end, the Court in Pelletier, faced with a negative medical 
certificate, remained unconvinced by the evidence, including testimony by the taxpayer, that the 
taxpayer was entitled to the DTC. Courts have not always been so willing to consider looking 
past the certificate requirement. In the subsequent case of Islam v R (Islam),116 the Court quoted 
the Federal Court of Appeal in Buchanan, which had stated that “a positive medical certificate is 
a requirement of subsection 118.3(1). The Court does not have a policy-making role. If the 
requirements of the Act are seen to be impracticable, it is Parliament that must address the 
necessary changes.”117 While the interpretation of Buchanan in Pelletier is thus questionable, it 
shows that in at least one case the judge believed he could interpret an unambiguously negative 
certificate as positive and thus had a great deal of latitude in determining eligibility.  
While judges have at times acknowledged the limitations imposed on them by the 
legislation, they have also seemed willing in many cases to themselves evaluate impairments 
based on their own observations of the taxpayer in the courtroom. In some ways, judges taking 
an active role in determining whether the taxpayer qualifies for the credit may be consistent with 
the disability literature critical of the power given to doctors in determining disability.118 On the 
other hand, the criticisms surrounding granting doctors too much power were, at least to a certain 
extent, rooted in their inability to fully assess the situation,119 and this same concern surely 
would also apply to judges assessing impairments based on their own observations of the 
individual’s impairment. The scrutiny of the capabilities of the taxpayer in court, encouraging 
people with disabilities to act sick and incapable and avoid participation in the legal process, is 
incongruent with the disability literature. Thus, while it may be necessary for courts to interpret 
the meaning and assess the credibility of medical evidence provided by professionals, judges 
                                                          
 
111 Ibid at para 20. However, it is notable that the Court later points out that the taxpayer could not remember his 
accountant’s name, though the Court believed this was a credibility issue, not a memory recollection issue (ibid at 
para 26). 
112 Pham, supra note 97 at para 11. 
113 2008 TCC 425 [Pelletier]. 
114 2002 FCA 231[Buchanan]. 
115 Pelletier, supra note 113 at para 42. 
116 2013 TCC 175 [Islam]. 
117 Ibid at para 27, quoting Buchanan, supra note 114 at para 26.   
118 See discussion in section I.B. Social Policy Responses to Disability, above. 
119 Bickenbach, supra note 18 at 1323. 
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need to be aware of the limitations of their own expertise, particularly in assessing functional 
impairment. 
 
D. COMPASSION PLAYS A ROLE IN DECIDING WHO IS ENTITLED TO 
THE DTC  
 
In Radage v R (Radage),120 a case that predates the decade review period in this article, Justice 
Bowman stated: 
 
If the object of Parliament, which is to give to disabled persons a measure of relief 
that will to some degree alleviate the increased difficulties under which their 
impairment forces them to live, is to be achieved the provisions must be given a 
humane and compassionate construction.121 
 
In Radage, Bowman J tied humane and compassionate construction to a liberal, as opposed to a 
narrow or technical, interpretation of the provision.122 
A number of more recent cases have acknowledged the humane and compassionate 
approach set out in Radage. In some cases, it appears to be used to lend additional support to the 
taxpayer’s claim. For example, in Pekofsky, this approach seems to have been used to support the 
Court’s decision to patch together two medical certificates to declare that the medical certificate 
requirement was met.123 Similarly, Bowman J’s humane and compassionate approach was 
quoted in Benoit v R (Benoit),124 in which the Court concluded that the credit was available in the 
face of contradictory medical evidence. On the other hand, while courts acknowledged this 
approach in Lewis,125 Walkowiak,126 and Gourlay,127 they all decided against allowing the DTC. 
 Does this humane and compassionate approach conflict with the disability literature?  
One could argue that all human beings, including judges, should act with compassion and 
humanity towards other human beings. Disability scholars who advocate for needs-based 
financial support would likely support a compassionate and humane approach that promotes a 
more flexible application of the requirements, such as allowing late filing of certification, as was 
done in Greenaway v R,128 and considering medical evidence to supplement the original form, as 
was done in Gibson.129  
On the other hand, it is peculiar that the phrase “humane and compassionate” seems to be 
tied to the interpretation of the DTC in particular, whereas in the interpretation of other income 
tax provisions the move away from literal or textual interpretation was justified without resort to 
                                                          
 
120 [1996] 3 CTC 2510 (TCC) [Radage]. 
121 Ibid at para 45 [emphasis added]. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Pekofsky, supra note 103 at para 17. 
124 2014 TCC 95 at para 27 [Benoit]. 
125 Lewis, supra note 91 at para 22. 
126 Walkowiak, supra note 99 at para 21. 
127 Gourlay, supra note 89 at paras 20–21. 
128 2010 TCC 42. 
129 Gibson, supra note 108 at paras 19–20. 
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sentiment or emotion,130 thus suggesting that the subjects of the DTC call for special treatment. 
This idea is bolstered by the decisions in Lewis and Benoit, in which the respective courts 
commented that the person under consideration was “deserving” 131 of the approach in the 
circumstances. This suggests adherence to the now-denounced charitable model of disability, 
under which disabled people were objects of pity and deserving of help.132 Perhaps this approach 
would be justifiable if courts made it clear that it applied to all instances involving applying tax 
law to all individuals, as humans deserving of compassion and humanity, as opposed to only 
persons with disabilities. 
 
E. PROVING ENTITLEMENT TO THE DTC IS NOT AN AFFRONT TO 
THE CLAIMANT’S DIGNITY  
 
In McMillan the taxpayer argued that he should be permitted to use the DTC despite not having 
filed a T2201 form. The taxpayer had been awarded a disability pension under the Canada 
Pension Plan and, based on this award, he argued he should not need to produce evidence of his 
disability in order to qualify for the DTC. According to the taxpayer, requiring him to re-submit 
proof of his disability was contrary to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms133 (Charter) because 
it amounted to double or triple jeopardy, and also violated his right to life, liberty and security of 
the person.134  
In an oral judgment, Justice Pizzitelli dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal. The taxpayer’s 
argument that section 7 of the Charter was violated was based on a proposition that the 
requirement to submit evidence of the disability was a violation of his dignity, and therefore, his 
life, liberty and security of the person. The Court pointed out that while dignity might underlie 
life, liberty and security of the person, it is not a stand-alone section 7 right. Further, Pizzitelli J 
stated:  
 
I fail to understand how the requirement for a medical certificate as a condition of 
gaining access to a tax benefit can be an affront to the dignity of the Appellant … 
Whatever anxiety, stress or stigma suffered by the Appellant in having to prove his 
disability within the meaning of a provision that purports to grant a tax benefit from 
the Government does not, in my view, constitute in any way a violation of section 
7.135 
 
The easy dismissal of the Charter argument in McMillian may be troubling to disability 
scholars and advocates who use a human or civil rights approach to advocate for change.136 
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131 Lewis, supra note 91 at para 32; Benoit, supra note 124 at para 38. 
132 See Haegele & Hodge, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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and the Americans with Disabilities Act” (2000) 21:1 BJELL 213 at 214. 
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Further, even if Charter rights are not breached, this does not mean that the qualification process 
has no effect on dignity, broadly speaking. Dignity can have many meanings,137 and one 
meaning centres on a person’s identity, integrity, and feelings of self-worth and self-respect.138 
Disability scholars have identified dignity as an important disability policy goal.139 It is not 
difficult to see why it may be an affront to one’s dignity to be required to submit oneself to 
medical evaluation and request a form that will certify that one is impaired in some capacity, 
especially if it must be done repeatedly to qualify for separate programs. While a full solution to 
this is not obvious, it is not clear that the courts (and perhaps more importantly, legislators) are 
aware of this issue. 
 
F. THE PURPOSE OF THE DTC IS TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE  
 
It is generally well accepted that, under the “modern principle,” statutes, including the ITA, are to 
be interpreted in light of their context and purpose, in addition to legislative intent.140 Thus, the 
courts have appropriately considered the purpose of the DTC in interpreting the provision.    
On several occasions, the courts have stated that the purpose of the DTC is to provide 
financial assistance to people with disabilities.141 The courts in both Gourlay and Pekofsky 
quoted Johnson v R,142 which in turn quoted from Radage, in which the Court stated:  
 
The legislative intent appears to be to provide a modest amount of tax relief to 
persons who fall within a relatively restricted category of markedly physically or 
mentally impaired ... [T]he object of Parliament … is to give to disabled persons a 
measure of relief that will to some degree alleviate the increased difficulties under 
which their impairment forces them to live … .143 
 
Along similar lines, comments from the bench in McMillan show that there is a common 
perception that the credit has a subsidy purpose: “the rationale for the DTC … was to financially 
assist a person who suffers from severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment in bearing 
the additional costs of living and working generated by the impairment itself.”144 Thus, the courts 
appear to view the DTC as a subsidy (i.e., a tax expenditure).   
                                                          
 
137 For a discussion of the meaning of dignity, see Errol P Mendes, “Taking Equality Into the 21st Century: 
Establishing the Concept of Equal Human Dignity” (2000) 12:1 NJCL 3; Rex D Glensy, “The Right to Dignity” 
(2011) 43:1 Colum HRLR 65. 
138 Lennart Nordenfelt, “The Varieties of Dignity” (2004) 12:2 Health Care Analysis 69 at 75–76. 
139 Karrie A Shogren, Ruth Luckasson & Robert L Shalock, “Using Context as an Integrative Framework to Align 
Policy Goals, Supports and Outcomes in Intellectual Disability” (2015) 53:5 Intellectual & Developmental 
Disabilities 367 at 368–369.  
140 Elmer A Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87; Stéphane Beaulac, 
Handbook on Statutory Interpretation (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 26; Arnold, supra note 86 
at 6:15; Canada Trustco, supra note 130 at paras 10–13. 
141 Bleiler, supra note 93 at para 13; Gourlay, supra note 89 at para 20, quoting Johnston v R, [1998] 2 CTC 262 
(FCA) [Johnston]. 
142 Johnston, supra note 141. 
143 Pekofsky, supra note 103 at para 12; Gourlay, supra note 89 at para 20; Radage, supra note 120 at para 45. 
144 McMillan, supra note 88 at para 16. 
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The courts’ view of the purpose of the DTC is significant as it may impact the 
interpretation of the provision.145 A potential issue arises, however, when one compares the 
courts’ view of the DTC as financial assistance (and thus a tax expenditure) with the views of tax 
scholars and other experts, who, as previously noted, view the credit as a technical tax provision 
intended to measure ability to pay and thus achieve tax fairness.146 Although purpose is only one 
of the three touchstones of statutory interpretation (the other two being text and context), a lack 
of agreement with respect to the DTC’s purpose could nonetheless give rise to uncertainty in its 
application where more difficult interpretive issues arise. 
 
IV. TAXPAYER PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY REFLECTED 
IN THE RECENT CASE LAW  
 
The case law can also be examined to uncover the taxpayer perspective. The taxpayer in these 
cases is either a person with a disability or a caregiver. There are obvious limitations with respect 
to using court decisions to determine taxpayer perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about disability 
as all of these things are filtered through judges (the authors of the reasons). These taxpayers are 
a small sample of all disabled people and their caregivers, and, as in any court case, the 
arguments made by the taxpayers will be motivated by self-interest. Further, the group cannot be 
presumed homogenous. Still, the cases do provide some insight into the beliefs of at least some 
taxpayers. 
Why are the views of taxpayers relevant? Their ideas about disability and the policy 
response to disability, if not aligned with current law, could identify a need for policy reform. 
This is particularly the case if the DTC is viewed as disability support, as many claimants of the 
DTC are themselves members of the disability community, and therefore should be consulted.147 
Further, examining taxpayer views may identify a lack of understanding of the provision’s 
purpose or availability, in which case there may be a need for public education or simplification 
of the provision. However, this can only occur after the government clarifies the DTC’s purpose. 
In their appeals, the taxpayers most often argue that the existing rules should be 
interpreted to entitle them to the credit. Examples include individuals with single eye blindness 
in Lewis, sleep apnea in Beauchamp v R148 and Girard v R,149 food allergies in Marceau, dyslexia 
in Gourlay, mental health in Cook v R, 150 seizures in Pakarinen v R, 151 headaches in Fontaine, 
and diabetes in Hutchings v R.152   
In other cases, it appears that the taxpayers are really arguing that the legislation should 
be different than what was enacted. As an example, in the case of Ostlund v R, the caregiver of a 
child with Asperger’s syndrome maintained that he should be entitled to the DTC despite the 
child not meeting the marked restriction requirement.153 The parents appeared to argue that they 
                                                          
 
145 For a description of this “modern principle” see note 140 and accompanying text. 
146 See section II.C. Legislative Perspectives on the Policy Response to Disability, above. 
147 Philipps, supra note 36 at 105. 
148 2008 TCC 189. 
149 2006 FCA 65. 
150 2008 TCC 458. 
151 2010 TCC 456. 
152 2009 TCC 375. 
153 Ostlund v R, 2011 TCC 197. 
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should be entitled to the DTC because it was their investments in the child (including 
opportunity costs) that enhanced their child’s potential.154 This seems to be at odds with 
legislative intent, as the DTC was drafted in a way that seems to exclude entitlement in such 
cases.  
Taxpayers have also argued, in effect, that the category of family members who can 
qualify to use the credit should be expanded,155 demonstrating the narrowness of the existing 
rules and a disagreement between the taxpayers and legislators in terms of the appropriate scope 
of the DTC. If the DTC is a tax expenditure that is intended to recognize the additional costs of 
disability, it might seem to make sense to loosen the rules and allow the support person the credit 
in order to indirectly support the disabled person.156 If the DTC is intended to be a technical tax 
provision, DTC transfers to family members appears to be inconsistent with the ability to pay 
principle157 because our system uses an individual tax unit. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that the support person’s ability to pay has been reduced because of the responsibility to support 
a dependent with a disability. Whether or not the concept of ability to pay would take into 
account, for example, lost wages due to caregiving responsibilities is not clear. 
Several taxpayers argued that the certification requirements were too onerous or 
otherwise problematic. The taxpayer in Islam, for example, pointed out that it is costly and 
unreasonable to get a medical certificate each year.158 In McMillian the taxpayer argued that 
subjecting himself to medical examination (again) was an affront to his dignity.159 There are also 
other examples of cases where taxpayers argued or suggested that qualification should be 
connected to other programs.160 This is supported by academic commentary that disability 
supports should be better integrated with one another.161 Thus, the views of some scholars and 
taxpayers conflict with those of legislators with respect to the qualification process, though I 
acknowledge that political and practical concerns may mask legislators’ views of ideal policy (as 
I explain in more detail in the next section). 
 
V. FURTHER EXPLORING THE DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS, 
ATTITUDES, AND BELIEFS ABOUT DISABILITY  
  
The foregoing examination of the DTC exposed and compared perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs 
about disability and the appropriate policy response to disability. Here, I discuss further 
conflicting perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs. Although this article is not focused on prescribing 
policy changes, I take this opportunity to offer some possible suggestions in order to prompt 
further investigation and discussion. 
One problem is that lawmakers have not made the goal of the DTC clear. It is difficult to 
have a policy discussion without a consensus on whether the DTC is a tax expenditure or a 
                                                          
 
154 Ibid at para 4.  
155 O’Neill v R, 2008 TCC 548; Scott v R, 2009 TCC 36; Luschtinetz v R, 2015 TCC 320.  
156 Though it should be noted that there are other credits available to caregivers. See note 63, above. 
157 See section I.C. Tax Policy Responses to Disability, above. 
158 Islam, supra note 116 at para 29. 
159 McMillan, supra note 88 at para 5. 
160 Brassard v R, 2014 TCC 82 at para 6; Nancarrow v R, 2013 TCC 258 at para 3. 
161 See e.g. Torjman, Five-Point Plan, supra note 80 at 2–3.  
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technical tax provision. The current government has initiated a review of tax expenditures,162 and 
although its primary objective is to cut tax expenditures, clarifying the purpose of the DTC 
should nonetheless be a part of this discussion. Is the purpose of the DTC to account for the 
impact of costs of disability on ability to pay (thus, a technical tax provision)? Or, is the purpose 
to provide financial support for persons with disabilities (thus, a tax expenditure)? Although tax 
and disability writers have made assumptions about the purpose of the credit, either of these 
interpretations could be made consistent with the normative arguments in the two bodies of 
literature, provided the resulting gaps are dealt with in other distinct provisions or programs. For 
example, if the government confirms the DTC is a tax expenditure, the impact of costs of 
disability on ability to pay could be addressed through another provision in the ITA. 
Alternatively, if the government labels the DTC as a technical tax provision, financial assistance 
for persons with disabilities can be addressed through another program inside or outside of the 
tax system. Once the purpose is identified, it can be widely communicated163 and reform 
opportunities (such as, for example, transferability and refundability) may be identified to better 
align the DTC with its purpose. This should improve perceived fairness of the DTC, thus 
boosting the credibility of, and perhaps even compliance with, the tax system.  
The disability studies field offers important insights into both how disability should be 
viewed as well as the appropriate policy response. After examining the DTC court cases over the 
past decade, it is also clear that judges’ attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs concerning disability 
are often not in line with those expressed in contemporary disability literature. In a number of 
cases, comments made by judges in decisions reflected stereotypical views of persons with 
disabilities, thus impeding advancement of the project of promoting full participation in society. 
This problem could perhaps be addressed through judicial education.  
Also, it is clear that legislators’ views of disability do not align with the disability 
scholarship. For example, the DTC’s focus on impairment and basic functioning ignores 
important aspects of disability by failing to look to the effect of functional limitations on the 
individual’s participation in society, considering relevant contextual factors. This may at least 
partially be attributable to legislators’ lack of awareness of the social model or how to integrate it 
into policy definitions of disability. If the DTC is a tax expenditure, legislators should, for 
example, investigate the possibility of expanding the credit’s criteria such that it would be 
available to those who incur significant non-deductible disability-related costs of participating in 
society, including items such as transportation or housekeeping. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that many taxpayers also do not agree with the 
legislators and judges with respect to what the DTC qualification criteria and process should be. 
While it is likely that there will be disputes over eligibility wherever the line is drawn, legislators 
and courts should strive to continue to balance fairness, administrative concerns, and certainty. 
For example, the Court’s role could be clarified, and taxpayer compliance costs could be reduced 
through coordination with other programs164 where appropriate. 
                                                          
 
162 Canada, Minister of Finance, Growing the Middle Class, (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2016) at 211, 
online: <budget.gc.ca/2016/docs/plan/budget2016-en.pdf> [perma.cc/6CKU-QV8K]. 
163 Because of the confusion over the purpose of the credit, the 2002 Standing Committee Report recommended an 
educational strategy to including the purpose of the credit. See House of Commons, Tax Fairness, supra note 75 at 
30.  
164 Philipps, supra note 36 at 96–98. A comprehensive list of other disability-related programs can be found in Atul 
Jaiswal, Lynn Roberts & Mary Ann McColl, A Review of Disability Policy in Canada, 3rd ed (2017), online: 
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There are some practical and political constraints on structuring the DTC. Financial 
considerations likely drive restrictive qualification criteria and monetary limits.165 Also, the tax 
system tends to be a less flexible policy tool, and thus less able to respond to individual 
circumstances than other policy tools, such as, for example, financial assistance programs 
outside of the tax system.166 The decision to use a tax expenditure rather than a direct policy may 
be attributed to federalism and the fact that the federal government has not assumed the role of 
funding disability to a major extent.167 Even the decision to use a credit rather than a deduction 
has a federalism aspect to it, as it leaves the provinces free to determine how much, if any, to 
grant as their own disability tax relief. Finally, as with all policies of this nature, the government 
needs to be concerned with the economic and equity effects of mimickers.168 The need to verify 
the presence of a disability, for example, is a practical reality. These musings are not meant to 
exonerate the government from poor policy choices, but to point out that there are always 
practical and political constraints on policymaking. This means that the choices made may reflect 
considerations other than the legislators’ views on disability. 
There seems to be current political will to re-examine both disability policy and tax 
expenditure policy. This is a prime opportunity to address the DTC, which lies at the intersection 
of these two policy areas. However, this article demonstrates that there are differing opinions 
with respect to the meaning of disability and the appropriate policy response to disability. This 
prompts us to step back and have a discussion about the larger question: what do we, as a 
society, owe people with disabilities?169 The time might be right for the federal government to 
lead the way by engaging publicly with this question and to start making and promoting 
meaningful changes to disability tax policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Canadian Disability Policy Alliance <disabilitypolicyalliance.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/polscan-fed-
280217.pdf> [perma.cc/8JH8-4TY8].  
165 Torjman, Disability Supports, supra note 75 at 11. 
166 Philipps, supra note 36 at 95. 
167 Torjman, Five-Point Plan, supra note 80 at 1. 
168 Weisbach, supra note 16 at 82. 
169 Jongbloed, supra note 15 at 207. 
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